The Autorité de la concurrence considers that Google holds a dominant position on the advertising market linked to search engines.
It considers that competition law can apply limits to Google’s actions and provide a response to the competitive stakes brought to light by the actors, without the need to implement sector-wide regulations.
It proposes targeted responses to the identified concerns.
In February 2010, a referral was made to the Autorité de la concurrence by the Minister for the Economy, Finance and Employment, relative to the operation of competition in the online advertising sector, in application of article L. 462-1 of the French Code of commercial law (Code de commerce).
As in the retail world, the Internet is playing a growing role in the daily lives of individuals and households. Search engines, and Google in particular, have become the entry point for online browsing. This central position has generated criticism and even concerns on the part of many actors, some of whom consider that they have been victim of unfair and even illegal actions on the part of Google. Schematically, this involves:
- competing search engines that view that Google’s hegemony results from efforts to close off markets, or other actors present on the Internet who fear that the conditions under which Google is diversifying into other markets do not fall within the framework of merit-based competition;
As a reminder, the “Creation and Internet” mission entrusted to Messrs. Patrick Zelnik, Jacques Toubon and Guillaume Cerutti, brought these concerns to light in the report delivered to the Minister for Culture and Communication in January 2010, and suggested a referral to the Autorité de la concurrence for an opinion.
Search-related advertising1 represents a specific market that cannot be replaced (not substitutable) by other forms of communication, notably because it allows for very fine-tuned targeting, and because no other equivalent alternative offer exists in the eyes of advertisers. Indeed, it makes it possible to approach a prospect when searching actively and therefore close to the buying act (on the delineation of relevant markets and notably on the distinction between online and off-line advertising, as well as between “search” and “display”, see page 23 to 26 of the opinion).
In this market, many elements converge2 in order to indicate that Google holds a dominant position (for more details, refer to pages 41 to 49 of the opinion): market share, price level, nature of customers relations, margin level, etc. The entry barriers also appear to be high when it comes to developing an activity as a competing search engine, because of the investments at stake for the development of the algorithms and indexing of content, as well as due to the size effect.
In and end of itself, this dominant position is not reprehensible: it results from a great deal of innovation, supported by significant and continuous investments. Only the abusive exercise of such market power could be sanctioned.
It has identified possible exclusionary conduct intended to discourage, delay or eliminate competitors through procedures that do not consist of merit-based competition (artificially high entry barriers, excessive exclusivity clauses in terms of their field, duration or scope, technical obstacles etc.), and possible operational abuses, whereby the search engine apparently imposes exorbitant conditions on its partners or customers, treats them in a discriminatory manner or refuses to guarantee a minimum degree of transparency in the contractual relations that it establishes with them (see summary table of the various practices, pages 76 to 78 of the opinion).
Providing its opinion on a consultative basis, the Autorité makes no ruling as to the legality of such practices that would merit, in order to be pursued, often long and complex investigations. Nevertheless, this analysis framework clearly indicates that competition law can apply limits to Google’s actions and provide a response to the competitive stakes pointed out by the actors.
After a recent referral by the Navx company with regard to Google’s opaque and discriminatory practices, the Autorité de la concurrence ordered the search engine to implement a series of urgent interim measures, that were then confirmed and clarified as part of a commitment procedure, (see fiche 3 of the press pack). For its part, the European Commission has just initiated a formal investigation regarding Google, that is notably intended to consider the issue of how the search engine ranks Internet sites according to natural search results or within the framework of commercial links, a question that is the focus of many concerns.
The special case of the press
The press is very concerned by the present opinion, since it is simultaneously Google’s customer, partner, competitor and potential supplier.
The Autorité considers that the transparency obligations of the Sapin law should be transposed to the online advertising sector
One of the reasons for publisher dissatisfaction has to do with the absence of any audit or data certification provided by Google, notably the net revenues on the basis of which the remittance owed to partners is calculated within the AdSense services3. The Autorité de la concurrence calls on the lawmaker to clarify or complete the current legal framework stemming from the Sapin law such as to take into account the advertising sector’s new operating conditions. This could result, for example, in the implementation of minimum “reporting” obligations as well as, for the most significant networks, an audit mechanism with possible verification by a third party certifying authority (relative to these matters, see pages 68 to 70 of the opinion).
Press publishers must be able to request and obtain exclusion from Google News
Press titles claim a “form of economic free riding” by Google via the “Google News” aggregator: by presenting the best from each publication, which no editor can obviously do individually, Google is positioning itself as the reference site for accessing information, without paying any financial consideration to the newspapers that bear the costs for creating quality information. It is very important for press publishers to be able to request and obtain exclusion from “Google News”, but without necessarily being delisted by the Google search engine. The latter company has recently made commitments along these lines to the Italian competition authority: the indexing of press content in “Google News” must be uncoupled - by means of a simple and prior initiative on the part of publishers - from that of the content that can be accessed through the generalist search engine. The French Autorité de la concurrence will see to it that these commitments, that Google claims to have already implemented, are respected in France.
The Autorité hails the initiatives made by the sector’s actors to pool their resources and to promote the emergence of fee-based digital kiosks
The press is currently faced with the digital challenge, and Google cannot seriously be designated as the main cause of the difficulties being experienced by the sector.
In this regard, the Autorité hails the initiatives taken by the sector’s actors to pool their resources and to promote the emergence of fee-based model. Major actors in the [French] national daily press (Libération, Le Figaro, L’Équipe, Les Échos, Le Parisien), together with several magazines (l’Express, le Point, le Nouvel Observateur), have announced the set-up of an economic interest group (EIG) for the purpose of developing a common online press portal.
For the purposes of legal certainty, however, the opinion includes analytical elements relative to ensuring the compliance of these initiatives with competition law (see pages 72 and 73 of the opinion).
1When a web surfer formulates a query, the search engine returns results that consist of “natural” (i.e. algorithmic) links and commercial links (generally placed to the right of the Google result pages).
2The Autorité provides this opinion on a consultative basis. The present market analysis may be modified within the framework of other proceedings, notably to take into account of the very fast developments of the sector (technical progress, takeovers...).
3Google offers to site editors partnerships through its AdSense service. Advertising revenues are shared between Google and the partner site. AdSense for search proposes a search facility on the pages of a partner editor. AdSense for Content proposes the posting of relevant adverts chosen among those from editors wishing to use that advertising way according to the words existing in the pages of a site partner to the Adsense network.